





William Stephens & Stijn Sieckelinck: Working Across Boundaries in Preventing Violent 






Working Across Boundaries in Preventing Violent Extremism: 
Towards a typology for collaborative arrangements in PVE policy 
 
William Stephensa1 & Stijn Sieckelinckb 




Received Jul 11, 2019 
Accepted Sept 23, 2019 










The question of how to prevent violent extremism is being vigorously pursued by policy 
makers, practitioners, and researchers, across the world. We need only briefly peruse the 
research literature to see that this is a question crossing disciplinary lines with theories and 
perspectives emerging from education, psychology, psychiatry, criminology, sociology, 
public health, and political science. Similarly, the wide range of sectors addressing this 
question is evident in the working groups convened by the European Union’s Radicalization 
Awareness Network, which includes: youth, families and communities, education, local 
authorities, prison and probation services, police and law enforcement, and health and social 
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Abstract 
Preventing violent extremism has become a concern for policy makers at all levels 
from municipal governments to international organisations. A common feature of 
policy at all levels is the call for collaboration between different sectors, 
professionals, organisations and communities. While collaboration features so 
centrally in PVE policy, currently there is no overarching framework through 
which the many instances of collaboration can be analysed or compared. This 
paper offers a typology of collaborative arrangements in PVE policy derived from 
a multilevel policy analysis. This typology creates a foundation for further 
research into the effectiveness and limitations of different collaborative 
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care (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2019). Professionals and practitioners across these 
sectors are called upon to collaborate with one another, and at times with ‘society-as-a-
whole’, in a joint endeavor to prevent violent extremism (e.g. European Commission, 2016; 
Home Office, 2015; Nationaal Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, 2016; Public 
Safety Canada, 2013; United Nations General Assembly, 2015; Vlaamse Regering, 2015). 
Thus, teachers, doctors, clergy, municipal workers, community leaders, social workers, 
police, and individual citizens find themselves tasked with working across traditional 
boundaries in order to address a problem that is cast as one of the major challenges of our 
time.    
While some studies have pointed to the benefits of collaborative approaches in 
preventing violent extremism (PVE) (e.g. Sestoft, Hansen, & Christensen, 2017), it is far from 
a simple matter. Indeed, a significant body of literature has been highly critical of approaches 
which have involved educators and health and social care workers in monitoring and flagging 
signals of extremism (e.g. Mattsson & Säljö, 2017; McKendrick & Finch, 2017; Middleton, 
2016; O'Donnell, 2016; van de Weert & Eijkman, 2018). We are faced then with a complex 
social problem requiring a multi-faceted response but in which there are significant barriers to 
collaboration. This challenge necessitates a deeper examination of what collaboration does, 
and could, look like in the context of PVE, and what kinds of collaborative arrangements may 
be the most effective.  
 Beutel and Weinberger (2016) make helpful steps in this regard, drawing on lessons 
from public-private partnerships in other areas of social policy and highlighting distinct 
features of partnering in the context of violent extremism. However, a comparison and 
evaluation of the effectiveness of different collaborative arrangements is hampered by the 
absence of an overarching theoretical framework through which to view different instances of 
cross-sector collaboration in the context of PVE.  As a step towards greater clarity in this area, 
this paper proposes a typology of collaborative arrangements in the field of PVE, derived 
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Although the issue of preventing violent extremism is relatively new in social policy, 
the notion of collaborating across boundaries to address social problems is not. There is a rich 
history, particularly in the realms of crime and public health, of policies directed at drawing 
together different sectors including health, education, and civil society, to address a common 
problem. A brief review of the literature on this topic provides the central dimensions along 
which the typology is built, and highlights some of the distinct issues associated with 
collaboration in the context of preventing violent extremism. This is followed by the policy 
analysis, the resulting typology, and two examples from practice highlighting some of the 
challenges of collaboration. Finally, the implications of this typology for future research and 
practice are discussed. 
 
Working Across Boundaries in Social Policy 
 
Efforts to promote cross-sector collaboration to address social problems has given rise to an 
extensive literature addressing all manner of issues, and a host of new concepts relating to 
governance including: ‘collaborative governance’ (Ansell & Gash, 2007), ‘network 
governance’ (Provan & Kenis, 2008),  the ‘whole-of-government approach’ (Christensen & 
Laegreid, 2007), ‘partnered government’ (Beutel & Weinberger, 2016),  and the ‘whole-of-
society approach’ (Papademetriou & Benton, 2016). The full extent of the literature on 
working across boundaries in social policy is beyond the scope of this brief review, rather the 
literature is drawn upon to highlight some key issues arising in relation to collaborative 
arrangements. Particular attention is given to the literature on collaboration in crime 
prevention and public health as fields in which the prevention of violence, and the 
collaboration of educators, health and care workers, has played a central role. Three key 
issues are addressed in the review: why collaborative ways of working emerge, the different 
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A number of authors point to the fact that collaborative approaches have grown in 
prominence in social policy in Europe and the United States in recent decades (Christensen & 
Laegreid, 2007; Crawford, 1997; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). The literature addresses two 
aspects related to this rise in collaboration: the first is the general drive to collaboration due to 
the inherent complexity of social problems defying single-sector solutions, the second is the 
particular motivations that may drive any given collaboration. That is to say, while 
complexity may be considered the fundamental genesis of collaborative approaches, in any 
particular instance of collaboration the actors may be driven by a range of motivations, for 
example,  conviction in the importance of collaboration or an institutional requirement to 
collaborate. 
 
‘Meta-‘ or ‘Wicked’ Problems as a Driver of Collaboration 
The nature of many challenges addressed in social policy is complex, with multiple 
interacting factors at play. These challenges cannot be adequately addressed through single-
sector approaches as their causes do not fall neatly within organisational boundaries such as 
‘social care’, ‘health’, ‘education’, or ‘security’ (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Christensen 
& Laegreid, 2007; Crawford, 1997; Selsky & Parker, 2005). These are issues that ‘tend to fall 
through the cracks of prevailing institutional arrangements’ and therefore necessitate multi-
institutional collaborations (Selsky & Parker, 2005, p. 852). An issue such as high crime rates 
in a particular neighbourhood cannot be effectively addressed by policing alone, but rather 
touches upon issues such as the planning of urban space, the availability of extra-curricular 
activities, and access to work, that are the concern of multiple organisations and professionals. 
This complex, multi-faceted, nature of many social problems becomes particularly 
acute when a preventive logic is applied. Rik Peeters (2013), who charts the historical rise of 
prevention as a mode of social policy, describes prevention as a boundless concept in that 
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“As there is no way of knowing whether enough is being done to prevent an 
undesirable future, prevention has the tendency to produce more prevention. At the 
very moment a causal scheme is constructed between an undesirable future and its 
possible determinants, this expansive logic may take effect: seen through a preventive 
gaze, the effectiveness of interventions is presumed to increase when measures are 
taken as early as possible and when the range of measures is as broad as possible to 
cover all identified risks.” 
 
Because a preventive logic implies tracing back to address antecedent issues, it quickly 
expands beyond the sector in which the problem to be prevented finds expression. By its very 
nature then, prevention tends to extend beyond single sector boundaries. 
This is readily apparent when considering two areas strongly associated with 
preventive policy making: improving public health and tackling crime. Consider the case of 
obesity, a problem which finds its culminating expression in the field of medicine, with 
doctors seeking to mitigate the impact of obesity on the life of the individual involved. Seen 
from a preventive perspective, obesity becomes an issue that is to be addressed by the food 
industry, the media, schools, and local community groups, and others. This is evident for 
example in the approach of ‘Health in all policies’ for tackling obesity outlined by Hendriks et 
al. (2013). Similarly, preventing crime involves intervening long before something falls under 
the realm of the police, which means addressing issues in other realms including education, 
youth work, and care. As a recent example, the concern with knife-related crimes in the 
United Kingdom has led to teachers and schools being assigned a central role in preventing 
the spread of knife ownership amongst young people (Bulman, 2019).  
In a similar vein to the impact of a preventive logic, the recent trend towards 
resilience-building as a central concept in social policy (Duit, 2016) inherently motivates 
multi-sector approaches. The notion of resilient governance is predicated on the idea of the 
complexity of social problems requiring complex and multi-faceted responses (Chandler, 
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prevention and resilience building, tend to demand multi-sector or whole-of-society, 
responses. 
Complexity as a driver of collaboration is certainly relevant to the issue of preventing 
violent extremism. That the causes of violent extremism are complex and multi-faceted is 
widely accepted. Identifying the causes and pathways to extremism has been a fractious 
matter, with ongoing debates about what drives the process of individuals becoming 
‘radicalised to violent extremism’ (Coolsaet, 2016; Dzhekova, Mancheva, Anagnostou, 
Stoynova, & Kojouharov, 2016). Regardless of the accuracy of the identification of the 
factors involved in driving violent extremism, for the purpose of this current analysis it is 
sufficient to state that multiple factors have been identified, and that most policies advocate 
multi-faceted responses (Hardy, 2018). The factors include, amongst many others, a lack of 
capacity for complex or critical thinking (Liht & Savage, 2013), a lack of a sense of purpose 
(Kruglanski et al., 2014), discrimination and marginalization (Zięba & Szlachter, 2015), the 
attraction of being part of a clearly defined group (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008), and experiences 
of violence (Crone, 2016; Sageman, 2017).  These factors clearly cannot be adequately 
addressed by a single sector, particularly not the police and security services who are charged 
with preventing extremist-motivated violence. A preventive lens on extremism, and the 
current focus on resilience building (Stephens & Sieckelinck forthcoming), leads us directly 
to seeing the relevance of the role of educators, youth workers, and social care. 
 
Motivations for Collaboration 
While the issue of complexity may underlie the drive towards collaboration, the actual 
motivations for any particular instance of collaboration is often not as simple as actors 
collaborating from a shared conviction that they require one another in order to address a 
particular problem. There are other factors at play. Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) point to the 
changing role of the state as a key factor explaining the rise of collaboration in social policy in 
general. A commitment to cross-sector collaboration may be driven by a desire for ‘small 






William Stephens & Stijn Sieckelinck: Working Across Boundaries in Preventing Violent 






of the problems faced. Christensen and Laegreid (2007) chart the move to a ‘whole-of-
government’ approach to tackling social problems in the UK, which has contributed to an 
institutional culture in which collaboration and partnership are the expected norm. A similar 
idea is addressed by Crawford (1997) in his analysis of the emergence of partnership as a 
central aspect of a modern discourse on crime prevention. He suggests that part of the move to 
collaboration and partnerships is driven by an institutional or ideological commitment to this 
mode of working.  Thus, the overriding reason for partnerships may be to address complex 
problems, but for any given partnership the motivation may be driven more by an external 
requirement to work in collaboration or an intrinsic belief in the importance of collaboration 
rather than a direct response to the failures of a single-sector approach. 
The differences in motivation for collaboration are nuanced but important. This 
becomes clear if we consider three examples in the context of preventing violent extremism: a 
group of professionals, organisations and agencies may enter into a partnership out of a shared 
desire to tackle the problem of preventing violent extremism and a recognition that they 
cannot do it alone, or they may be driven to collaborate primarily to meet funding 
requirements, or they may be institutionally or legally required to collaborate.  
In the context of PVE then, there are likely to be motivations and drivers for 
collaboration beyond the fact that the problem to be addressed is a complex one. For example, 
multi-sector approaches to tackling crime exist in many cities, and often preventing violent 
extremism becomes one of the questions tackled by these existing collaborative structures 
(e.g. Denmark, the Netherlands, Canada). The starkest example of collaboration driven by 
legal requirement is the UK’s Prevent strategy, in which different sectors such as health and 
education have a statutory duty to engage in collaboration with other agencies including the 
local government.  Clearly, the forces motivating any collaborative arrangement can affect the 
dynamics of such an arrangement – the question of the distribution of power is central to the 
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Forms of Collaboration 
After considering the reasons for collaboration and the motivating factors, a second 
significant issue is what form collaboration takes. The terminology for different ways of 
working across traditional boundaries is extensive, representing somewhat different notions 
and ideas (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). These include: ‘cross-sector partnerships’ (Selsky & 
Parker, 2005), ‘whole-of-government’ and ‘whole-of-society’ (Christensen & Laegreid, 
2007), ‘multi-agency’ (Sestoft et al., 2017), ‘community engagement’ (Cherney & Hartley, 
2017), and ‘networks’ (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002).  
Following others (e.g. Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002; Whelan & Dupont, 2017) who have 
sought to distinguish between forms of collaboration, rather than seek to define all the 
different terms used in the field, consideration is given to some central factors that shape 
different forms of collaboration, namely, a) the degree of formality of the collaboration, b) the 
composition of the collaborative arrangement – that is, which actors are involved, and c) the 
purpose of the collaborative arrangement. 
 
Degrees of Formality 
One of the key dimensions along which forms of collaboration can be differentiated is 
that of the degree of its formality (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). Sullivan & Skelcher (2002) 
draw on concepts from organisational science to distinguish forms of collaboration along a 
spectrum ranging from a ‘network’, in which collaboration is informal, loose, and self-
governing, to ‘integration’, in which different bodies merge and there is a clear hierarchical 
structure. In between is the amorphous concept of ‘partnership’, which has a higher degree of 
formality than a network, involving some form of agreement between the different parties 
involved but one in which distinct organizational identities are retained. It should be noted 
that the application of terminology is not consistent across the literature, and in some places 
‘network’ may be used to refer to a formalized arrangement. The central issue here is to point 
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The Constellation of Actors 
Another distinguishing feature of different forms of collaboration concerns who is 
involved. Collaborative arrangements in social policy can include: government agencies, 
professionals, civil society organisations, community groups, community leaders, private 
industry, or even the public as a whole (Bryson et al., 2006). A ‘partnership’ between 
government and ‘community’ is different than a partnership between a group of organisations 
– in large part due to the concreteness of the entities involved in the collaboration, and the 
relative distribution of power amongst the entities. That is, who is involved in the 
collaboration can be an important dimension in influencing its functioning, with different 
constellations of actors giving rise to different degrees of trust and power imbalance. 
 
The Purpose of the Collaboration 
A final, but central, distinguishing feature of different forms of collaboration arises 
from their purpose and mode of functioning. Collaborative arrangements can exist for a wide 
range of purposes, Whelan and Dupont (2017) identify a number of different classifications of 
network goals, including service implementation, information diffusion, information 
exchange, knowledge generation, problem solving, coordination, and community capacity 
building. It is possible to distinguish between collaborations on the basis of their primary 
function, the suggestion being that collaborations with the same purpose or function are likely 
to have similarities regardless of their specific context. For example, networks of 
professionals and academics that centre on the sharing of expertise and ‘best practice’ can be 
found in relation to many different social issues and can be distinguished from the many 
partnerships whose primary function is to plan interventions for specific cases.  
While there are probably other dimensions along which different forms of 
collaboration can be distinguished, and although all collaborations will be unique, these 
factors are identified in the literature as particularly relevant for understanding the functioning 
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In the context of PVE we can find a full range of forms of collaboration operating at 
different levels of formality, with different constellations of actors and working for different 
purposes. As will be explored in the coming sections, the question of the constellation of 
actors and the purpose of collaboration may be particularly pertinent to issues surrounding the 
question of collaboration in PVE. Given its relation to issues of national security, the 
constellation of actors may not formally include intelligence agencies – but their presence as 
an invisible actor to whom any information shared may be relayed – likely influences 
questions of trust and transparency in collaborative arrangements. Similarly, as will be 
explored further, there can be a perception in the context of PVE that collaborations which 
purport to do one thing, build community cohesion for example, mask a hidden or additional 
purpose to gather intelligence.  
 
Constraining and Enabling Factors in Collaborative Arrangements 
Central to much of the literature is the question of what makes for effective 
collaboration. It should be noted that most often effectiveness is addressed in terms of the 
ability to collaborate rather than the effectiveness of the outcomes or services provided 
through collaboration (Turrini, Cristofoli, Frosini, & Nasi, 2009). A starting premise is that 
collaboration tends not to be easy, and its effectiveness cannot be presumed (Bryson et al., 
2006). There are a number of factors that are suggested to be working against collaboration. 
In his analysis of partnerships in crime prevention, Crawford (1997, p. 59) uses a colourful 
metaphor to highlight the mismatch between the desire for collaborative working and existing 
structures and modes of working:  
 
“It is as if collectively we have suddenly awoken from a two hundred year reverie to 
find that we have been preoccupied with playing a game according to the wrong set of 
rules. And yet, the new rules do not seem to fit the structure of the game, the terrain it 
is played on, or the traditional relations between the players, let alone between them 
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This metaphor alludes to the challenges posed by the different logics driving different entities 
that are expected to work in collaboration. This issue is often raised in the context of 
preventing violent extremism, in which the different logics of educational professionals and 
security agencies are in conflict (O'Donnell, 2016): whereas the educationalists are  concerned 
with developing and cultivating skills and knowledge in young people, the security agencies 
are more concerned with maintaining order and preventing attacks. It cannot be taken for 
granted that these two different institutional logics and purposes can easily collaborate 
without undermining one another’s purpose (Sieckelinck, Kaulingfreks, & de Winter, 2015).  
How these differences in logic and purpose are navigated and overcome brings into 
sharp relief the question of power. Mismatches of power are frequently cited as a constraining 
factor in effective collaboration, with one entity in a collaborative arrangement holding more 
power in decision making and the allocation of resources (Bryson et al., 2006; Sullivan & 
Skelcher, 2002). At the extreme end of the spectrum would be collaborations in which the 
mismatch of power renders the involvement of certain actors essentially tokenistic, in that 
they have no real say or veto in relation to decisions.  At the other end would be an equal 
sharing of power and responsibility, in which each actor carries equal weight in decision 
making. 
In the case of PVE, this is often a markedly important issue. Given the nature of the 
challenge of violent extremism and its relation to national security, there is often a controlled 
flow of information along hierarchical lines, meaning, for example, that intelligence services 
will have access to information not available to the police, and police will have access to 
information not available to frontline social workers. While this asymmetrical flow of 
information may cause frustration to certain parties, it takes place within a context of 
asymmetrical responsibilities and rights. Not only are there, of course, legal restrictions on the 
sharing of information, there are also different standards to which parties will be held. If 
something does go wrong, culminating in an attack, the police and intelligence services will 
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Given these factors, the possibility of an equal dialogue in such a context is contextually 
constrained.  
This is particularly significant given that the factors that have been indicated to 
facilitate effective collaboration include trusting and transparent relationships and a shared 
vision and purpose (Bryson et al., 2006; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). While not suggesting 
these conditions are impossible to achieve in the context of PVE, the issues discussed above 
point to the significant challenges that are faced in collaborating in this context. 
The literature on collaboration in social policy is vast, and this review is far from 
exhaustive; however, it serves to highlight some of the overarching issues that have emerged 
in relation to collaboration, and has sought to indicate some of the distinct features of PVE in 
relation to these issues. A primary purpose of this is to identify pertinent factors that can be 
drawn upon in developing a typology of collaboration in the context of preventing violent 
extremism. 
 
Towards a Typology 
 
A typology is not a classification which seeks to create exhaustive, mutually exclusive 
categories through which existing entities can be sorted. Rather, it consists of the development 
of an ‘interrelated sets of ideal types’ against which entities can be measured in terms of the 
extent to which they ‘fit’ the ideal type (Niknazar & Bourgault, 2017, p. 194). Typologies are 
valuable in that they reduce complexity whilst capturing important relationships and 
interdependencies (Niknazar & Bourgault, 2017). As theory, they contain both descriptive and 
predictive power: the closeness of an entity’s fit with an ideal type should predict an outcome 
associated with that type (Niknazar & Bourgault, 2017). In the context of violent extremism,  
Koehler (2017) presents a typology of approaches to de-radicalisation arguing that, as there 
can be no-one size fits all approach, we need to be able to draw conclusions about what 
strategy will work best for any given situation. He suggests that a typology allows for 
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specific case of networks, Whelan and Dupont (2017, p. 681) argue that a typology is helpful 
in so far as it is able to ‘bring into focus the underlying purpose behind any network’ which 
can aid researchers and practitioners in matching a network arrangement to a specific goal. 
Thus, in a field lacking a clear overarching theoretical framework through which to 
compare and analyse the many proposed collaborative arrangements, the development of a 
typology offers higher-level description allowing comparison of types of collaborative 
arrangement rather than specific cases. Higher-level description in this manner also offers the 
possibility of determining the type of collaborative arrangement best suited to a particular 
policy goal and context. 
 
Context 
The research leading to this typology is part of a larger project funded by the Dutch 
Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Sport under Grant 326434. This project, ‘Authoritative 
Alliances’, is investigating grassroots practices aimed at preventing violent extremism that 
involve the collaboration of different actors and adopt primarily social and educative rather 
than security-driven strategies. As well as following these practices in the field, we are 
examining the policy context in which these practices are embedded. It is in order to 
understand this embedded policy context that we have conducted a multi-level policy-analysis 
looking at at international, national, and municipal level PVE policy documents or action 
plans. The following typology has been developed as an outcome of this analysis. Another 
strand of the project includes thirty-two interviews with policy-makers and practitioners in 
three countries regarding their perspectives on PVE2. While the interview data will be the 
subject of a future paper, and are not systematically analysed in this paper, two short vignettes 
drawn from three of these interviews are presented to highlight certain issues arising in 
collaboration in practice. 
 
2 The research project meets the ethical requirements of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Informed consent was 
obtained from all interview participants, and participants have been anonymised. Interview data is stored on a 
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The typology was generated through an iterative process of examining policy 
document descriptions of different forms of collaboration in the context of PVE and 
examining the academic literature on collaboration in social policy.  Iterative coding of the 
policy document descriptions, and the academic literature, gave rise to the dimensions along 
which the typology is organized. 
 
Documents Analysed 
As part of the larger research project discussed above, twenty-seven policy documents 
(Table 1) were analysed. These documents correspond to the localities of the practices under 
study. The practices were purposively sampled, to capture variation within a Western 
European-North American context. This region shares certain similarities in the overall 
context of the challenge being faced: instances of homegrown terrorism and foreign fighters, 
while having no current internal conflicts. The practices were selected for variation – tackling 
different forms of extremism: religious and far-right, and within different national and 
municipal contexts. The sampling of documents arose from an extensive search of all 
governmental (local, national, and international) documents that address the question of 
preventing violent extremism. The websites of each of the governmental bodies was searched 
for references to violent extremism, radicalization, and polarization. All documents that 
emerged from these searches were then reviewed to identify those documents that addressed 
the issue of preventing radicalization or preventing violent extremism.  In addition, during 
interviews with policy makers from municipalities and national governments, participants 
were asked to identify policy documents relevant to issue.  In identifying the documents from 
the European Union and United Nations, we looked at which documents were referenced in 
national and municipal policies, and then an extensive search was carried out on the sites of 
the different bodies of these organisations to identify further relevant documents. Finally 
contacts within the European Commission and United Nations were asked to identify key 
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an official governmental body, addressed PVE explicitly, and covered the locality of one of 
the practices.  In a number of cases ‘prevention’ was one part of an overall document on 
tackling extremism and terrorism.  In those cases, only the sections explicitly dealing with 
prevention were analysed. 
 
Table 1: Documents Analysed 
 
Document Title Author Date  
Intergovernmental    





United Nations Letter dated 22 December 2015 
from the Secretary-General to the 
President of the General 
Assembly Re.  The United 
Nations Global Counter-




United Nations Preventing Violent Extremism 
Through Education – A guide for 
policy makers 
UNESCO 2017 
United Nations Preventing Violent Extremism 
Through Promoting Inclusive 
Development, Tolerance and 
Respect for Diversity 
UNDP 2017 
European Union European Commission 
Communication: Preventing 
Radicalisation to Terrorism and 
Violent Extremism: Strengthening 





 European Union  European Commission 
Communication: supporting the 
prevention of radicalization 
leading to violent extremism 
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European Union Prevention of Radicalisation and 
recruitment of European citizens 





National/Regional    
Belgium (Flanders 
Region) 
Action plan for the prevention of 
violent radicalisation and 
polarisation: Overview of actions 
and measures 
Vlaamse Regering 2015 
Belgium (Flanders 
Region) 
Actualisering van het actieplan ter 
287reventive van gewelddadige 
radicalisering en polarisering 
Vlaamse Regering 2017 
 UK  The Prevent Duty: Departmental 





UK Counter-Extremism Strategy UK Home Office 2015 
UK  Revised Prevent Duty Guidance 
for England and Wales 
UK Home Office 2016 
UK Prevent Duty Toolkit for Local 
Authorities and Partner Agencies 
UK Home Office 2018 






Canada Public Report on the Terrorist 




Netherlands National Counterterrorism 
Strategy 
NCTV 2016 
Netherlands Handreiking aanpak van 
radicalisering en 
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Netherlands Voortgangsrapportage integrale 
aanpak jihadisme 
NCTV  
Netherlands Actieprogramma Integrale 
Aanpak Jihadisme 
 2014 
Netherlands De Role Van gemeenten in de 





Municipal/City    





London Preventing Extremism in London London Assembly 






Prevent Strategy and Delivery   
Utrecht Utrecht zijn we Samen Gemeente Utrecht 2015 
The Hague Speerpuntenprogramma Gemeente Den 
Haag 
2015 







The documents were analysed through coding using Atlas.ti 8.0. Initially the 
documents were coded according to a coding scheme (Annex 1). The codes in this scheme 
were derived from the different approaches to PVE that were found in a review of the 
academic literature (Stephens, Sieckelinck, & Boutellier, 2019). Coding was conducted by the 
main author, with regular debrief with two supervisors in which samples of the coding were 
discussed and adjustments made to the coding scheme. Additionally, a second researcher 
conducted blind coding of a selection of the documents. Following the blind coding, 
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there was consensus on coding categories. During this first round of coding, in addition to the 
coding scheme, open codes were generated to capture approaches or strategies that were not 
covered in the initial coding scheme.  These open codes were reviewed and discussed by the 
team of three researchers. 
A first analysis of the results of the coding indicated that, broadly, all the documents 
referred to a wide range of strategies and approaches, and the major differences between 
documents lay in the particular weight given to different approaches. However, a striking 
feature was the frequency with which the open-generated code ‘partnership’ occurred across 
all the documents – it was the most frequent code in the analysis. In order to investigate this 
more closely, three subsequent rounds of coding were conducted in which the ‘partnership’ 
code was disaggregated, first in terms of the stated goals or purpose of the collaboration or 
partnership, second in terms of composition of actors stated to be involved in the 
collaboration or partnership, and finally in terms of the degree of formality of the 
collaboration. In terms of the stated goals or purpose the collaboration, eight different codes 
were generated to capture the purposes mentioned in the documents. These included ‘best-
practice exchange’, ‘intelligence sharing’, and ‘dialogue’. Through comparing and contrasting 
these codes, they were reduced to six distinct purposes, which make up the ‘purpose’ 
dimension of the typology. All instances of collaboration were coded in terms of the 
composition of actors, coding by all named actors e.g. ‘police’, ‘education professionals’ or 
‘experts’. The composition of these arrangements was then also compared with the ‘purpose’ 
codes to look for patterns or consistencies between purpose and composition. The final stage 
of coding distinguished between different degrees of formality, ranging from ‘aspirational’ 
where there was a call for collaboration but no structure described, to ‘formalised structure’ 
where a clear outline of the form and functioning of the arrangement was described.   
These disaggregated codes were then examined in light of the wider literature on 
collaborative approaches to addressing social problems. An iterative process of moving 
between the coding and the literature to identify key themes across different dimensions, led 
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As highlighted earlier, a number of central dimensions along which collaborative 
arrangement can be compared have been identified in the literature. The dimensions selected 
for this typology are: purpose, composition, degree of formality, and power dynamics.  
 
Purpose refers to the goals and aims of the collaborative arrangement, which can range from 
the sharing of information, to the devising of plans, to the carrying out of joint activities.  
 
Composition refers to the different actors involved in the collaborative arrangement, this can 
range from a well-specified group of actors to a vaguer notion of collaboration of ‘relevant 
organisations’ or the public as a whole. 
 
Degree of formality refers to the extent to which formal mechanisms and arrangements exist 
to manage and organise the collaboration.  These can range from informal ad-hoc 
arrangements in which modes of collaboration are figured out by the parties involved, perhaps 
for short term periods, to formalised structures and arrangements with a clear delineation of 
duties and powers. 
 
Power dynamics refers to the relative distribution of power in decision making and resource 
control among the parties involved in the collaboration. 
 
The first two dimensions – purpose and composition - are constitutive of the different 
types of collaborative arrangement, the final two - degree of formality and power dynamics – 
are largely outcomes of the purpose and composition of the arrangements.   
Other dimensions considered were ‘geographical spread’ and ‘time span’ – that is 
whether these are arrangements operating at local, national, or international levels, and 
whether these are arrangements operating for short term projects or span many years.  
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of the ideal types identified operating at city, regional, and national levels, and across 
different time spans. 
 
The Typology and Its Implications 
 
This typology (Table 2) presents six types of collaborative arrangement derived from an 
analysis of policy documents directed towards preventing violent extremism. While other 
typologies of partnerships and networks exist (e.g. Mitchell & Shortell, 2000; Moore & 
Koontz, 2003; Whelan & Dupont, 2017), this typology is valuable in that it addresses the 
specific context of PVE, a context in which there is a proliferation of partnerships yet with no 
coherent theoretical framework through which to view these collaborations. It should be noted 
that this typology concerns the forms of collaboration envisaged in policy rather than those 
that are found on the ground in practice – the implication being that there are likely other 
types of collaborative arrangement, or combinations of these types, that emerge outside the 
strictures of policy documents that may not conform with these ideal types. The final section 
of this paper addresses each of the ideal types, providing a brief example of each from the 
documents reviewed, and then considers the implications of this typology for research and for 






William Stephens & Stijn Sieckelinck: Working Across Boundaries in Preventing Violent Extremism: Towards a typology for 









Table 2: A Typology of Collaborative Arrangements Across Traditional Boundaries in the Context of Preventing Violent Extremism 
 STRENGTHENING SOCIETY INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND 
INTERVENTION 
 




Engagement to Build 
Trust and Legitimize 






Purpose To present a united front 
against extremist ideas, 
united around a set of 





To engage in dialogue 
and build bridges 
between groups 
perceived as different. 
To create links between 
the ‘grassroots’ and 
institutions and agencies. 
Two-fold role: to ‘hear 
from the grassroots’ and 
for decisions to build trust 
and legitimacy by 
communicating policy 
plans through local actors. 
To facilitate a flow 
of intelligence 
pertaining to risk of 
radicalisation. 






level risk to 
security services. 












media, private sector, 
public as a whole 
Community groups, 




Community leaders or 





















Ranges from ad-hoc to 
more formalised 
ongoing arrangements 
Ranges from ad-hoc 
arrangements for specific 
policy questions to 
ongoing engagement. 
Ranges from 




From ad-hoc to 








William Stephens & Stijn Sieckelinck: Working Across Boundaries in Preventing Violent Extremism: Towards a typology for 













Often driven by 
government, although 




largely equal. No high 
stakes decisions or 
actions. 
Driven by government, 
community representative 
has limited power to 







intelligence does not 




institution – often 
local government. 
Controlled flow of 
information – not 




notionally as an 
equal exchange of 
knowledge, certain 
disciplines 
perceived to be 
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Two Overarching Orientations: Strengthening Society and Intervention. 
The types of collaborative arrangement fall under two overarching orientations. The 
first orientation, ‘strengthening society’, is concerned with creating a bulwark against 
extremism and polarization.  That is, these are types of collaborative arrangement that in 
various ways seek to create conditions to prevent extremist ideas from taking hold in 
communities.  This can be likened to the discourse on resilience building, in which actions are 
taken to build values, narratives, or connections, that are strong enough to resist attraction to 
extremism and violence. The first three types, ‘Coalitions for Countering’, ‘Dialogue and 
Bonding Networks’, ‘Engagement to Build Trust and Legitimise’ would fall within this 
overarching orientation. 
The second, ‘Intelligence Sharing and Intervention’, refers to collaborative 
arrangements with a more targeted focus on individuals and information pertaining to specific 
risks. They are concerned with the flow of intelligence between different sectors, and the 
planning and carrying out of interventions.     
The final type ‘Knowledge Exchange Networks’ falls outside of these overarching 
orientations, and represents a typical kind of network found in other professional and 
academic circles to enable the exchange of knowledge and best-practice.  
 
Coalitions for Countering  
This refers to collaborative arrangements which have the purpose of countering 
extreme ideas and narratives by promoting a sense of shared values that are in opposition to 
extremism or generating and disseminating alternative narratives to undermine or replace 
extremist narratives. 
They can range from informal collaborations at a community/city level to generate and 
disseminate positive messages about the community, to formalized collaborations between 
schools and civil society, to the most formal, contracted partnerships to produce counter-
narratives. At the most informal end of the spectrum would be loose, even rhetorical, 
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against extremism, uniting around a set of values which are argued to be representative of the 
city, nation, or region and are placed in opposition to extremism. The rhetorical power of this 
collaboration often rests on the diversity of the entities involved (different religious groups, 
different community groups, or society as a whole) being united around a set of values. There 
is an implication that either one is part of the coalition against extremism or one supports 
extremism.  In some ways this may appear akin to the notion of bonding in social capital 
theory, in which social bonds create a shared identity (Ellis & Abdi, 2017). However, rather 
than the development of connections at the grassroots these coalitions tend to be built on 
governmentally defined shared values or narratives. This can be likened to an artificially 
constructed shared identity which renders ‘extremists’ as the ‘out group’, but without 
necessarily strong bonds between those encapsulated within this constructed identity.  
An example from the United Kingdom’s Home Office is:  
 
At the heart of this strategy is a partnership between government and all those 
individuals, groups and communities, who want to see extremism defeated. It is a 
partnership that will not only seek to counter the ideology spread by extremists, but 
will stand up for the shared values that unite us as a country: values that include 
democracy, free speech, mutual respect, and opportunity for all. 
 
The more formal manifestations of this type of arrangement involve coordinated and specific 
efforts to generate and promote alternative messages and ideas to specifically undermine the 
narratives of extreme groups. The following is an example of such an arrangement as 
described by the European Commission:  
 
 Support local and community groups working with former violent extremists and with  
victims of extremist violence to show young people that there is another side to the  
story. The Commission will also task the RAN with setting up a pool of practitioners,  
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addressing these issues in more depth. 
 
These collaborative arrangements are largely driven by government, although the operation of 
power in the forming of counter-narratives may be more subtle, with the government 
choosing to be an invisible partner funding civil-society organizations at a distance to avoid 
the narratives being directly associated with government (Beutel & Weinberger, 2016; van 
Eerten, Doosje, Konijn, De Graaf, & de Goede, 2017).  
 
Dialogue and Bridging Networks 
Dialogue and bridging networks are collaborative arrangements designed to strengthen 
understanding and bonds between different groups. Given their primary bridge-building 
function, these arrangements are not concerned with decision-making or taking action, nor 
with constructing counter-narratives or changing values, which somewhat evens out power 
dynamics as the stakes are low.   From a social capital perspective this would reflect the 
notion of social bridging in which bridges of understanding and tolerance are built between 
different communities (Ellis & Abdi, 2017). 
An example of this can be found in one of the policy documents of a municipality in 
the Netherlands in which there is a strategy to strengthen debate and dialogue between 
different groups and communities. There is a particular focus given to interreligious dialogue 
in order to foster connection and social cohesion at neighbourhood and city levels.   
 
Engagement to Build Trust and Legitimize 
These collaborative arrangements exist in order to smooth the relationship between 
community and government or other institutions of the state. They tend towards the more 
formal arrangements, in which selected individuals are included in higher-level discussions in 
order to represent the interests of a group or community. They are seen as a conduit for 
information to come from the ‘grassroots’ and as a means of legitimizing actions by 
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can be seen as a form of social linking – which refers to the building of communication and 
trust between communities and institutions (Ellis & Abdi, 2017). 
The Canadian federal government provides two examples of such forms of 
collaboration in its national strategy for building resilience against terrorism: 
 
1. the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security, jointly supported by Public Safety 
Canada and the Department of Justice, which brings together leading citizens 
from their respective communities with extensive experience in social and 
cultural issues to engage with the Government on long-term national security 
issues; and  
2. the RCMP’s National Security Community Outreach, which responds directly 
to the threat of radicalization leading to violent extremism through local 
initiatives intended to address potential political violence and to identify and 
address the concerns of minority communities. 
 
These first three types fall under the overarching orientation of strengthening society. It is 
unsurprising then that they can be viewed through the lens of social capital theory which 
posits these different forms of connection – social bonding, bridging, and linking – as 
necessary for strong, resilient, societies (Ellis & Abdi, 2017).  The following two types have a 
narrower orientation, directed at the identification of and response to risk. 
 
Intelligence Links 
This refers to arrangements designed to facilitate the flow of intelligence. At their 
most informal and loose these arrangements include the public as a whole being called into 
collaboration with the local government and police, to share information. They extend to 
more formal arrangements for professionals such as doctors, teachers, and social workers, to 
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An example of such an arrangement is illustrated by a policy document of a municipality in 
the UK: 
…we are ensuring that partners adopt a complete approach to preventing people from 
being drawn into terrorism. When a potential extremism or radicalisation issue is 
identified we need to ensure there is compliance with the referral pathway and 
escalation process. Furthermore, we need to ensure that 
individuals/agencies/organisations involved in the referral are supported through the 
process to manage the concern or issue. 
 
Arrangements for Informing and Intervening 
This refers to collaborative arrangements which focus on the exchange of intelligence 
regarding security threats and potential instances of radicalization and which develop multi-
agency response plans. While these arrangements also involve the exchange of intelligence 
and information, they differ from the former arrangement in that there is a degree of 
reciprocity in information exchange and collaboration in decision making and action. 
They often exist at a city or regional level and involve local government, police, and 
other professionals such as educators or social workers. The balance of power is usually 
asymmetrical: government or the police have a monopoly on information, so not all 
information is available to all parties in the collaborative arrangement if it is deemed to be 
security-sensitive.  
Examples of such arrangements can be found the ‘Safety Houses’ in the Netherlands, 
and ‘Channel Panels’ in the United Kingdom in which various agencies and the local 
government share information on specific cases and develop multi-agency action plans to 
respond to the identified risk. 
 
Knowledge Exchange Networks 
This refers to collaborative arrangements whose purpose is to facilitate the flow of 
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collaborations between countries or regions, or more systematic and ongoing networks with a 
structure to coordinate the flow of knowledge. The paradigmatic case of the latter would be 
the Radicalisation Awareness Network which operates to facilitate the sharing of expertise 
and practice in Europe (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2019). 
 
Challenges in Practice 
This typology is derived from an analysis of policy documents and as such captures 
the ideal types as envisioned at the level of policy making.  However, as previously discussed, 
a starting premise in much of the literature on collaboration is that it is not easy and cannot be 
presumed to be effective.  
Accounts emerging from interviews conducted with practitioners involved in different 
forms of collaborative arrangements testify to some of these challenges. We will briefly 
address two examples to highlight some of the issues at play, the first being an example of a 





Troubles in a Coalition for Countering 
 
The director of a large mosque in a large European city, serving thousands of community 
members, was involved in taking action to combat and counter potentially radicalizing 
influences. He engaged the mosque in a collaboration with a government-backed provider 
which aimed at providing alternative avenues and information to the youth of the mosque. 
For some time this collaboration continued, receiving both academic and media attention. 
However, the collaboration came to an abrupt end when the mosque cut ties with the 
provider. During an interview the director of the mosque described his sense of betrayal 
when it became apparent that the other partner in the collaboration had a remit not only to 
provide a service to the young people, but also to monitor and report issues considered a 
security risk. This led to an immediate loss of trust and faith in the collaboration, making 
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This example points to a number of issues that have been addressed in the literature on 
collaboration, and some of the distinct issues associated with collaboration in the context of 
Preventing Violent Extremism.  A collaborative arrangement of a religious institution and a 
civil society organisation around a shared goal of counter-messaging was rendered impossible 
by different institutional goals, and a profound breach of trust. The religious institution had as 
its primary goal to build trust with young people in the community and share an alternative 
message to those presented in extremist propaganda about their role and place in society. The 
civil society organisation had a goal of monitoring and reporting that overrode its goal to 
build trust.  While the civil society organisation was in a ‘partnership for countering’ with the 
mosque, it was also working as a partner in an ‘intelligence link’3 with the police and security 
services. This is a particularly challenging issue in the context of preventing violent 
extremism in which the connotations and implications of being referred as a potential 
extremist risk are bound up with its association with terrorism and being subject to 
surveillance and intervention by security services.  
 
 
3 We are not in a position to ascertain the exact role being played by the civil society organization and rely on the 
perceptions of our interviewee, however regardless of whether the issue was real or perceived, the implications 
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This second example highlights again some of the challenges associated with 
partnership working identified in the literature. It would seem in this example that the drive to 
participate in collaboration is not motivated by a shared intrinsic belief that collaboration will 
address the complex problem at hand. On the one hand the local authority requires 
collaboration in order to have access to the information it deems necessary to do what it feels 
it is required to do. On the other hand, the civil society organisation is reluctant to share 
information with the formal body of the local government as they do not judge their cases to 
be sufficiently risky to require this, while the local government official is sceptical of their 
An uneasy arrangement for informing and intervening 
 
In a small city in the United Kingdom that is particularly concerned with issues pertaining to 
far-right extremism, an independent youth service organization developed, over time, a program 
for dealing with issues of far-right sentiments amongst the young people they were interacting 
with. Gaining attention and subsequently funding from the national government, this 
organization and its program expanded. As a service provider in the city, the programme is 
considered a partner of the local government, both in the exchange of information and in 
provision of interventions. However, during interviews with the organization, the local 
authority, and the police, clear tensions in this arrangement emerge. The organization describes 
the repeated calls for it to refer cases to the local authority, but states that none of the cases it 
has come across seem of severe enough to refer to a formal government-driven body.  During an 
interview with an official from the local authority, a great frustration was expressed at the lack 
of referrals. The official felt that they had no cases to address because the cases were getting 
stuck at the level of the youth organization. It was opined that the reason for the lack of referrals 
was that the organization wanted to protect its funding and continue to receive funding from the 
national government. The tensions are well captured in this quotation from the local authority 
official: 
 
“Because we don’t get funding we do rely on the likes of [youth organisation] but we’ve 
never had a referral from [youth organisation]. We’ve had many arguments about this, I 
said ‘come on you must have some’ but they’ve got quite negative thoughts about 
Prevent. That’s the way they come across to us. So they’ve openly said…one of their 
members has said they don’t believe in Prevent and the legislation, so that’s difficult. We 
have referred a few to [youth organisation] for support and they did a good…well one 
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judgement in this regard. Issues of trust and shared vision seem to work against a functioning 
collaborative arrangement in this case. Again, the specificities of the context of preventing 
violent extremism would seem to have a role to play, with the civil society organisation 
reluctant to share information that will then be accessible to the police and security services 
when they do not perceive the risk to warrant such attention.  This example points to one of 
the challenges Beutel and Weinberger (2016) point out in the context of violent extremism: 
the partners that may be valuable to government may also have significant barriers to 
collaborating due to a mistrust of authorities and a desire to maintain the trust of their 
community by maintaining a distance from authorities. 
These two small vignettes are not offered as representative of collaborative 
arrangements as they play out in practice, but rather to highlight some of the specific 
challenges to collaboration in the field of PVE. These challenges will be examined more 




The typology presented in this paper offers a descriptive framework of different forms of 
collaborative arrangement structured according to their purpose. Given the extent to which 
professionals and practitioners, communities, and even individual citizens, are called upon to 
work across traditional boundaries in order to prevent violent extremism, it is helpful to 
distinguish between different types of collaboration in order to recognise the possibilities and 
limitations of different ways of working.  
That preventing violent extremism falls into the realm of a complex social problem 
requiring a multi-faceted, collaborative, response is beyond much contestation. However what 
form this collaboration should take and how it could and should look is a more complex 
matter. It is abundantly clear in the extensive literature on collaboration that one of the central 
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involved, however this is perhaps one of the central challenges to collaboration in the context 
of PVE. 
It is unsurprising, given that these types are derived from policy documents, that 
government is often a central player in these arrangements. However, this makes for 
arrangements with often unbalanced dynamics of power, and the imbalance is potentially 
exacerbated by the nature of violent extremism as a national security threat, which creates 
insurmountable mismatches of information accessibility, since information that is deemed 
sensitive is accessible to some in a collaborative arrangement, but not others. The vignettes 
presented illustrate some of the challenges arising from this tension between the need for 
collaboration and the issues of power and trust that pervade the relationships between the 
parties in collaboration. Because of the nature of parties involved in these collaborations and 
the mismatches of access to information, issues of power and trust appear to be baked into 
these collaborative arrangement types. Whether and how this tension can be overcome in the 
context of PVE is an important question for empirical research. Examining different 
manifestations of these types of arrangement in different settings could throw light on how 
this has been achieved in practice.  
A second issue that arises when considering these different types is that of shared 
vision. As highlighted earlier, the literature on collaboration also points to shared vision as 
central to enabling effective collaboration. This raises two distinct issues. The first is for those 
collaborative arrangements that have the overarching orientation towards strengthening 
society. In these, collaboration involves uniting around and protecting of a certain set of 
norms and values in opposition to those that are extreme. This is rarely problematic when 
looked at in terms of uniting against violence; however, the uniting around deeper levels of 
norms, values, or narratives is no simple task. This is evident in the contentions that arise 
around the notion of teaching ‘national values’ (Elton-Chalcraft, Lander, Revell, Warner, & 
Whitworth, 2017; Peterson & Bentley, 2016), or reactions against narratives of 
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The second is for those collaborative arrangements with the overarching orientation 
towards intelligence sharing and intervention. In this instance we are faced with the challenge 
of shared vision around purpose and approach. Schools, youth workers, and police may share 
the overarching vision of preventing violence, but the more fine-grained vision of what it 
means to intervene in the lives of young people might be quite different. As discussed 
previously, the different institutional logics of these professions does not necessarily lend 
itself to the ready emergence of a shared vision in practice. Again, empirical analysis of 
different instances of collaboration can highlight how these tensions are overcome in practice.  
 
Implications for Research 
This typology presents a foundation for further research into collaboration across 
traditional boundaries in the context of preventing violent extremism. By providing a higher-
level description it is possible to consider specific cases of collaborative arrangements in 
relation to these types, facilitating the comparison and evaluation of arrangements across 
different policy regions. Further, the typology lays the foundation for evaluating the 
effectiveness of types of arrangements, rather than specific cases of arrangements, for 
achieving different policy ends. For our own research, this is an important step in being able 
to address the question of what forms of arrangement are most effective in facilitating 
resilient identity development in young people.  
Further, refining and extending this typology through an analysis of collaborative 
arrangements that exist ‘on the ground’ and may not reflect the ideal types of policy 
perspectives will give a fuller picture. 
 
Implications for Policy and Practice 
This typology can play both a clarifying and prescriptive role for policy makers and 
practitioners. By describing the different functions associated with different network types 
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arrangements, and to consider what arrangements they will put in place in the future. It also 
allows the identification of what certain arrangements cannot do in order to identify gaps.  
By providing the language and framework through which potential partners can 
describe the purpose and form of their collaboration it is also anticipated that this typology 




This typology provides the foundation of a theoretical framework to enable more extensive 
research into the types of collaborative arrangement in the context of PVE and their potential 
for achieving different policy goals. The typology is limited to official policy-prescribed 
collaborations and will benefit from extension through the mapping of collaborative 




This typology is derived from a selection of policy documents across different contexts, 
however there are not sufficient documents or contexts to claim of representativeness. 
Applying this typology to other contexts will be necessary to test its limitations and refine its 
scope. 
By focussing on policy documents this typology addresses the proposed forms of 
collaborative arrangements but cannot capture what happens in practice. Policy documents 
can represent politically motivated statements rather than actual reality in the field. Therefore, 
the collaborations in policy may very well not come to fruition for many reasons, and 
alternative forms of collaboration may emerge in practice that are not captured in policy 
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The research leading to this typology is part of a larger project funded by the Dutch Ministry 
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Code Sub Codes Code Description 
Individual  Interventions/approaches/perspectives  aimed at addressing the 
individual 
 Individual- Cognitive Interventions/approaches/perspectives focused on building some 
form of cognitive skill or capacity in individuals as a form of 
prevention. (e.g. critical thinking) 
 Individual-SocEmot Interventions/approaches/perspectives focused on developing 
some social or emotional capacity in individuals as a form of 
prevention. (e.g. empathy) 
 Individual – Values Interventions/approaches/perspectives focused on promoting or 
developing values in individuals as a form of prevention. 
Community  Interventions/approaches/perspectives  aimed at community level 
changes. 
 Community – 
engagement 
Perspectives aimed at building connections and trust between 
communities and formal institutions of society. 
 Community – resilient Perspectives aimed at promoting certain features or characteristics 
within communities (e.g. improving connections between 
community members) 
Society  Perspectives directed towards society level change (e.g. creating a 
more just society, reducing inequalities) 
Identity  Discussions of any identity related issues 
 Identity – Adolescence Reference to identity development/search and period of 
adolescence. 
 Identity – Threat  Reference to identities being threatened e.g. by globalization or 
minority status 
 Identity –  safe space Reference to need for space, safe space etc, for exploring identity 
questions – as a form of prevention. 




 Reference to dialogue or discussion as a form of prevention. 
Agency  Reference to agency/engamgement in action as a form of 
prevention. 
Drivers  Reference to drivers of radicalization  
 Drivers – Ideology Reference to ideologies as driver of radicalisation 
 Drivers – Vulnerability Reference to individual vulnerability as a driver of radicalization 
 Drivers – Group 
Dynamics 
Reference to group related drivers of radicalization, e.g. desire to 
be part of a group 
Goals  Any reference to the goals or desired outcome of the policy 
 Goal – Democratic Life Reference to developing democratic values/practices as desirable 
outcome 
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Annex 2: Codes Generated Through Open-Coding 
 
Code Description 
Counter-narrative References to the use or development of counter or alternative 
narratives. 
Employment References to tackling unemployment or creating opportunities for 
employment 
Partnership References to the need for collaboration or partnership between different 
organisations, institutions, and/or actors. 
Religion References to the role of religious communities or clergy in prevention. 
Restrict Propaganda References to restricting or blocking access to messages, websites, films, 
social media. 
Signaling References to training of actors to signal signs of radicalization or a 
requirement for actors to signal. 
Tackle Discrimination References to tackling discrimination (racism, islamophobia, hate 
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